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Casenote
TABLE DANCING AROUND THE FIRST AMENDMENT: THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF DISTANCE REQUIREMENTS IN
COLA CURCIO v. CITY OF KENT
I.

INTRODUCTION

Although the United States Supreme Court has held that nude
dancing is a form of protected speech under the First Amendment,
local and municipal governments have sought to regulate it
through various types of laws.1 For instance, an ordinance may require dancers to remain a certain distance from their patrons to
prevent drug transactions and prostitution solicitations. 2 Although
the Supreme Court has never decided the constitutionality of such
regulations, various federal courts have upheld these laws. 3 In so
doing, these courts acknowledged that distance requirements restrict a dancer's expression but sustained distance laws because they
serve a substantial governmental interest. 4 Yet, other courts have
1. See generally Daniel J. McDonald, Regulating Sexually Oriented Businesses: The
Regulatory Uncertainties of a "Regime of Prohibitionby Indirection" and the Obscenity Doctrine's Communal Solution, 1997 BYU L. REv. 339, 342 (1997). Such businesses have
been regulated via zoning ordinances, licensing requirements, nuisance laws, the
Federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act (RICO), obscenity
laws, and public indecency statutes. See id. at 341. Regardless of the regulatory
tool chosen, adult businesses have frequently challenged the constitutionality of
the particular restriction placed upon them. See id. at 342.
2. See DLS, Inc. v. City of Chattanooga, 107 F.3d 403, 410 (6th Cir. 1997). A
distance requirement could be a regulation of speech under the First Amendment
because it restricts a dancer's ability to freely express herself; this is determined on
a case-by-case basis. See id. at 409.
3. See id. at 415 (upholding constitutionality of six-foot distance requirement);
see also Zanganeh v. Hymes, 844 F. Supp. 1087, 1089 (D. Md. 1994) (six-foot); TMarc, Inc. v. Pinellas County, 804 F. Supp. 1500, 1506 (M.D. Fla. 1992) (threefoot); City of Colorado Springs v. 2354 Inc., 896 P.2d 272, 298 (Colo. 1995) (threefoot); Ino Ino, Inc. v. City of Bellevue, 937 P.2d 154, 168-69 (Wash. 1997) (fourfoot).
4. See City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 47-48 (1986)
(holding that restriction upon symbolic expression is constitutionally permissible
as long as it is aimed at ameliorating secondary effects of speech and not speech
itself); see also Dana M. Tucker, Preventing the Secondary Effects of Adult Entertainment
Establishments: Is Zoning the Solution?, 12J. LAND USE & ENVrL. L. 383 (1997) (outlining relationship between adverse secondary effects and adult entertainment
establishments).

(151)
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recognized that such distance regulations restrict a dancer's ability
5
to express herself artistically and to speak to patrons.
In Colacurciov. City of Kent,6 the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit considered whether a municipality may constitutionally impose a ten-foot distance requirement between a nude
dancer and her patron. 7 The owners of an adult entertainment establishment argued that this requirement was unconstitutional because it effectively banned table dancing, a unique form of
protected expression. 8 The government countered that the ordinance was a content-neutral restriction aimed at controlling the
harmful effects of nude dancing and was, therefore, a valid time,
place and manner restriction. 9
This Note examines the holding and rationale provided by the
Ninth Circuit in Colacurcioas well as the implications a ten-foot distance requirement has for First Amendment jurisprudence and individual dancers. First, this Note details the facts of Colacurcio.10
Second, this Note provides an overview of the First Amendment
and its application to symbolic speech, specifically nude dancing.1 1
Third, this Note explains the Ninth Circuit's rationale supporting
its holding in Colacurio.12 Fourth, this Note analyzes the court's
reasoning based on prior holdings and additional authority.1 3 Finally, this Note examines the likely consequences of the court's
14
holding in Colacurcio.

5. See, e.g., Kev, Inc. v. Kitsap County, 793 F.2d 1053, 1061 (9th Cir. 1986)
(enacting distance requirement to "prevent patrons and dancers from [the verbal
discourse which is necessary in] negotiating for narcotics transfers on the premises
of an erotic dance studio").
6. 163 F.3d 545 (9th Cir. 1998).
7. See id. at 548.
8. See id. at 549.
9. See id. The owners also argued that table dancing is a primary source of
income for their dancers and that the ordinance would consequently make it impossible to successfully run a studio in Kent. See id.
10. For a discussion of the facts and procedural background of Colacurcio, see
infra notes 15-27 and accompanying text.
11. For an analysis of prior cases dealing with the First Amendment, symbolic
speech, and nude dancing, see infra notes 28-99 and accompanying text.
12. For an examination of the Ninth Circuit's reasoning in Colacurcio, see infra notes 100-55 and accompanying text.
13. For a critical analysis of the court's holding and rationale in Colacurcio,see
infra notes 156-83 and accompanying text.
14. For a discussion of the potential consequences of this decision, see infta
notes 184-90 and accompanying text.
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FACTS

In April 1995, the City of Kent, Washington ("City of Kent" or
"City") amended its Adult Entertainment Ordinance to prohibit
nude dancing at a distance of less than ten feet from patrons. 15
Before the amendment was enacted, plaintiff Frank Colacurcio had
secured a site in the City of Kent to open a non-alcoholic adult
nightclub featuring nude table dancing. 16 The subsequent amendment to the ordinance effectively eliminated nude table dancing as
a lawful form of entertainment by banning nude dancing less than
ten feet from patrons. Therefore, Colacurcio brought suit challenging the ordinance as a violation of freedom of expression
17
under the First Amendment.
Before the City of Kent amended the ordinance, it spent several years examining adult entertainment.1 8 In 1994, Colacurcio
had challenged the City's initial regulatory ordinance. 19 In that
case, the district court noted that the zoning ordinance failed to
designate a sufficient number of permissible locations for adult entertainment businesses.20 As a result of this decision, the City and
Colacurcio executed a settlement agreement that permitted the
proposed nightclub to operate as a lawful non-conforming use
21
under the zoning law.

On March 7, 1995, the City of Kent adopted Adult Entertainment Ordinance 3214, which established "new standards for the licensing and operation of adult uses in the City of Kent." 22 After the
enactment of this ordinance, the King County Superior Court ruled
on a similar adult entertainment ordinance in Bellevue, Washington.2 3 To comply with the court's ruling in that case, the City of
15. See Colacurcio v. City of Kent, 163 F.3d 545, 549 (9th Cir. 1998). The city
felt that an amendment to its ordinance was necessary in order to conform the
legislation to a recent decision handed down by the King County Superior Court
based on a similar ordinance in Bellevue, Washington. See id.
16. See id. at 548.
17. See id. at 549.
19. Sep id 2t 548. During t iqPvqmin~tinn

the ci's ,'l-n;n..~

*. .

published a study reporting the effects of adult entertainment on surrounding
communities. See id.
19. See id.
20. See Colacurcio, 163 F.3d at 548.
21. See id. Although Colacurcio had not yet obtained the building permit for
the site he had chosen, the settlement agreement would permit his proposed night
club as a lawful non-conforming use once the permit was issued. See Colacurcio v.
City of Kent, 944 F. Supp. 1470, 1471 (W.D. Wash. 1996).
22. Colacurcio,944 F. Supp. at 1471.
23. See Ino Ino, Inc. v. Bellevue, 937 P.2d 154 (Wash. 1997).
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Kent amended its ordinance, which is now codified as Kent City
Code Section 5.10.010 et

seq.24

Soon after the City adopted the amended ordinance, the plaintiff brought this action for declaratory relief and damages pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.25 Colacurcio argued that because the statute
effectively eliminated all nude table dancing, which is a unique
form of expression, the statute warranted separate First Amendment analysis.2 6 Nonetheless, the United States District Court for
the Western District of Washington found in favor of the City of
27
Kent and plaintiff filed a timely appeal.
III.
A.

BACKGROUND

First Amendment, Generally

The First Amendment of the United States Constitution provides, in relevant part, that "Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press .. .. "28 The most widely
accepted justification for the freedom of speech is that the pursuit
of truth in a democratic society requires the free and unfettered
flow of valuable ideas. 29 Free speech has been called "one of the
24. See Colacurcio,944 F. Supp. at 1471. The new ordinance provides in part:
The portion of the exotic dance studio premises in which dancing and
adult entertainment by an entertainer is performed shall be a stage or
platform at least twenty-four (24) inches in elevation above the level of
the patron seating areas. [KCC 5.10.110(A)]. All dancing and adult entertainment by an entertainer shall occur on the entertainment performance areas intended for that purpose .

.

.

. No dancing or adult

entertainment by an entertainer shall occur closer than ten (10) feet to
any patron.
Id. The statute also provides minimum lighting requirements and prohibits dancers from receiving tips from patrons. See Colacurcio, 163 F.3d at 549.
25. See Colacurcio, 163 F.3d at 549.
26. See id.
27. See id. The district court ruled that "(1) the ordinance was a contentneutral time, place and manner regulation; and (2) the ten-foot distance requirement was narrowly tailored and left open ample alternative avenues for communication of protected artistic expression." Id.
28. U.S. CONST. amend. I. This law applies to the states via the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV (stating that
no state shall deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of
law).
29. See generally Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring) (holding free speech is vehicle for promoting truth discovery);
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (adoptingJohn Stuart Mills' theory that free speech is vehicle for promoting truth discovery). In addition, "the First and Fourteenth Amendments remove 'governmental
restraints from the arena of public discussion, putting the decision as to what views
shall be voiced largely into the hands of each of us, in the hope that use of such
freedom will ultimately produce a more capable citizenry and more perfect polity
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preeminent rights of western democratic theory [and] the touch30
stone of individual liberty."
The extent of governmental regulation of First Amendment
speech depends on the type of speech at issue.3 1 The United States
Supreme Court has held that freedom of speech is not absolute,
and certain forms of speech lack value and are not intended to fall
within the ambit of the First Amendment.3 2 The Court has, however, limited the circumstances under which a court may find that
speech is unprotected. 33 For example, in Cohen v. California,34 the
Court held that the words "Fuck the draft" were protected speech
because these words had an emotive content.3 5 Further, in Brandenburg v. Ohio, 36 the Court held that speech advocating unlawful ac-

tion is unprotected only where "such advocacy is directed to
inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite
37
or produce such action.
.... I" Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 534 (1980)
(quoting Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971)).
30. JOHN E. NowAK, ET AL., CONSTITtIlONAL LAW 830 n.1 (3d ed. 1986).
31. See generally Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 68 (1983)
(ruling that commercial speech is subject to limited First Amendment protection);
Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 570-71
(1980) (holding suppression of advertising contrary to purpose of First Amendment); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 44-59 (1976) (stating restrictions on political
speech are subject to rigorous scrutiny).
32. SeeChaplinskyv. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942). In famous
dicta of that case, Justice Murphy stated:
There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the
prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise
any Constitutional problem. These include the lewd and obscene, the
profane, the libelous, and the insulting or "fighting" words - those
which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate
breach of the peace. It has been well observed that such utterances are
no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social
value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is
clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.
Id. at 571-72; see also Miller v. California 413 U.S. 15, 34-37 (1973) (holding that
obscenity lacks value in "marketplace of ideas" and is therefore undeserving of
constitutional protection); Richard B. Saphire, Reconsidering the Public Forum Doctrine, 59 U. CIN. L. REv. 739, 753 (1991) (recognizing that First Amendment does
not prohibit government from re glating such expressive acts as perjury and solicitation of murder).
33. For a discussion of these cases, see infra notes 34-37 and accompanying
text.
34. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
35. See id. at 16, 26. In Cohen, Justice Harlan explained that the government
should not make principled distinctions between different kinds of speech since
"one man's vulgarity is another's lyric." Id. at 25.
36. 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
37. See id. at 447. In Brandenburg,defendant was a leader of an Ohio Ku Klux
Klan group. See id. He was charged with violating Ohio's criminal syndicalism
statute, which forbade the use of advocacy of crime or violence as a means of ac-
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Government Regulations on Speech

When the government seeks to restrict or regulate protected
speech, the degree of scrutiny that a court will apply to the regulation depends on whether the court views the regulation as contentbased or content-neutral.38 Content-based restrictions are based on
the message conveyed; that is, speech is restricted because of the
ideas or information it contains. 39 Government regulation cannot
control the content of speech unless it serves "a compelling state
interest and is narrowly drawn to achieve that end.

' 40

By contrast, regulations governing the time, place and manner
of speech that are unrelated to the suppression of First Amendment
rights do not violate the First Amendment. 4' In Ward v. Rock
Against Racism, 4 2 the Supreme Court held that a municipality may
impose reasonable restrictions on the time, place and manner of
protected speech, provided the restrictions: (1) are content-neutral;
complishing political or social reform. See id. at 44546. The Court struck down
the Ohio statute without considering whether defendant's speech could actually
be proscribed. See id. at 448. In so doing, the Court reasoned that speech advocating force or crime could be proscribed only if: (1) the advocacy is "directed to
inciting or producing imminent lawless action;" and (2) is "likely to incite or produce such action." Brandenburg,395 U.S. at 447.
The Supreme Court has never found a case that met the Brandenburg standard. For example, in Hess v. Indiana,414 U.S. 105 (1982), the Court held that the
following speech was protected because it failed to meet Brandenburg."We'll take
the fucking street later [or again]." Id. at 108-09. Further, in NAACP v. Claiborne
Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982), the Court held protected the following speech
by an NAACP official: "[I]f we catch any of you going in any of them racist stores,
we're going to break your damn neck." Id. at 902, 926.
38. See LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 7-8 (2d ed.
1988). In constitutional analysis, "scrutiny" refers to how closely the court will analyze and question a government action or legislative act. See id. The level of scrutiny that a court will apply depends upon how much the governmental regulation
burdens the asserted right and the level of importance that the court has assigned
to that asserted right. See id. In First Amendment speech analysis, courts essentially balance the speaker's asserted interest against the government's asserted interest. See id.
39. See, e.g., Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 461 (1980) (invalidating statute that
permitted dissemination of information on labor disputes but prohibiting all other
issues); Police Dep't v. Mosely, 408 U.S. 92, 100 (1972) (invalidating statute allowing labor picketing but disallowing non-labor picketing).
40. Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 231 (1987) (citation omitted). This type of analysis, which is commonly referred to as strict scrutiny, has been described as "strict in theory, but fatal in fact," as nearly all laws of
this genre will be struck down as violative of the First Amendment. See Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 540 (1980).
41. See, e.g., Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 554-55 (1965) (upholding law
restricting demonstration on busy street during rush hour); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 576 (1941) (upholding law prohibiting two parades from
marching simultaneously down same street).
42. 491 U.S. 781 (1989).
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(2) are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental43interest; and (3) leave open ample channels of communication.
C.

Symbolic Speech

The Supreme Court has long recognized that the First Amendment protects a citizen's right to free expression as well as free
speech. 44 Conduct is expressive when there is: (1) "intent to convey
a particularized message" and (2) a substantial likelihood "that the
message would be understood by those who viewed it.

45

In United States v. O'Brien,46 the Court articulated a test for determining whether laws restricting symbolic speech are constitutional. 47 The Supreme Court has determined that the O'Brien test
and the Ward test are virtually identical in application. 48 Laws that

43. See id. at 791 (citing Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468
U.S. 288, 293 (1984)). In determining whether an ordinance is content-neutral,
the touchstone inquiry is "whether the government has adopted a regulation of
speech because of disagreement with the message it conveys." Id. An ordinance is
narrowly tailored if it "promotes a substantial government interest that would be
achieved less effectively absent the regulation." Id. at 799. An ordinance will be
held to leave open ample channels of communication unless it would foreclose an
entire medium of expression across the landscape of a particular community or
setting. See Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 524-28 (1981)
(Brennan, J., concurring).
44. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968) (conceding that
burning draft card contains communicative element but sustaining law as appropriate means of serving government interest in effective draft administration); see
also United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 313-16 (1990) (holding flag burning
protected activity under First Amendment); Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405,
410-11 (1974) (holding peace symbol placed on American flag expression for First
Amendment purposes); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S.
503, 510-13 (1969) (holding black arm bands worn in protest of Vietnam War constituted expressive activity within meaning of First Amendment).
45. Spence, 418 U.S. at 410-11. The Supreme Court applied the Spence factors
in Ward and held that "[m]usic is one of the oldest forms of human expression,"
and was therefore protected symbolic speech. Ward, 491 U.S. at 790. The Ward
Court observed that "[flrom Plato's discourse in the Republic to the totalitarian
state in our own times, ruiers have known its capacity to appeal to the intellect and
to the emotions . . . ." Id.

46. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
47. See O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377 (holding that valid restriction of speech:
(1)must be within constitutional power of government; (2)must further important/substantial interest; (3)must be unrelated to suppression of free expression;
and (4)must ensure restriction on First Amendment freedoms is not greater than
governmental interest).
48. See Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 298
(1984) (stating that "validating a regulation of expressive conduct ... is little, if
any, different from the standard applied to time, place or manner restrictions.").

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2000

7

158

Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 7, Iss. 1 [2000], Art. 7
[Vol. 7: p. 151
SPORTS & ENT. LAW JOURNAL

VILLANOVA

regulate symbolic speech have been governed by either of these two
standards.

49

D.

Regulating Adult Entertainment

Local and municipal governments have sought to regulate the
adult entertainment industry in a variety of ways. 50 Such businesses
have been regulated through zoning ordinances, licensing requirements, nuisance laws, the Federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act (RICO), obscenity laws, and public
indecency statutes. 51 Regardless of the regulatory scheme, adult
businesses have consistently challenged the constitutionality of the
particular restriction placed upon them.5 2 Thus far, the Supreme
Court has often sustained these challenges, holding that adult businesses are entitled to First Amendment protection. 53 As a result of
49. See Barnes v. Glen Theatre Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 566-67 (1991) (applying
O'Brien test); see also Kev, Inc. v. Kitsap County, 793 F.2d 1053, 1058-62 (9th Cir.
1986) (applying Ward test).
50. See McDonald, supra note 1, at 341 (outlining various regulatory
approaches).
51. See id. Zoning ordinances are the most common regulatory tool, as historically "local zoning regulation has enjoyed a strong presumption of validity when
challenged." Id. at 341 n.10 (quoting Steven I. Brody, When FirstAmendment Principles and Local Zoning Regulations Collide, 12 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 671, 672 (1992)).
52. See McDonald, supra note 1, at 342. These challenges are usually based on
the First Amendment and, more specifically, contend that the services or products
provided by the adult business are forms of expression deserving constitutional
protection from governmental regulation. See id.; see also Barnes, 501 U.S. at 563
(contending that nude dancing is expressive conduct protected by First Amendment); City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 46-49 (1986) (contending that adult movie theater is expressive conduct within meaning of First
Amendment); Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 62 (1976)
(same).
53. See, e.g., Barnes, 501 U.S. at 565 (recognizing that in certain cases nude
dancing is protected form of expression under First Amendment); Renton, 475 U.S.
at 46-49 (finding adult movie theater entitled to First Amendment protection);
Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 72-76 (1981) (holding ordinance prohibiting live nude dancing unconstitutional); Young, 427 U.S. at 70
(finding movie theater that displayed sexually explicit films on regular basis entitled to First Amendment protection);Jenkins v. Georgia 418 U.S. 153, 161 (1974)
(holding "nudity alone is not enough to make material legally obscene . . ").
By contrast, the Court has stated that nudity cannot "be exhibited or sold
without limit" in public places. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 26 (1973). The
Miller Court announced that material is obscene if:
(a) [t]he average person, applying contemporary community standards
would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to prurient interests;
(b) [t]he work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual
conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) [t]he
work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific
value.
Id. at 24. However, the Supreme Court's tendency to engage in a First Amendment analysis of cases involving nude dancing indicates that it does not view all
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the fragmented nature of Supreme Court decisions dealing with
adult entertainment's level of First Amendment protection, a body
54
of murky and unmanageable case law has emerged.
1.

Zoning Laws

In Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc.,5 5 the City of Detroit
passed a zoning ordinance prohibiting the operation of any adult
movie theater, bookstore, and other similar establishments from locating within 1000 feet of any other establishment or within 500
feet of any residential area.5 6 A plurality of the Supreme Court upheld the ordinance as constituting a valid time, place and manner
restriction because it was designed to "preserve the quality of urban
life" by avoiding or militating against the secondary effects of the
regulated businesses. 57 While the plurality argued that First
Amendment protection of nude dancing is not absolute, five Justices argued that First Amendment protection should not vary with
the social value accredited to the speech by the judiciary. 58
nude dancing as obscene and unprotected. See, e.g., Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422
U.S. 922, 932 (1975) (stating, "[A]lthough the customary 'barroom' type of nude
dancing may involve only the barest minimum of protected expression .... this
form of entertainment might be entitled to First and Fourteenth Amendment protection under some circumstances.").
54. For a discussion of cases involving the constitutionality of government regulation of sexually oriented businesses, see infra notes 56-99 and accompanying
text.
55. 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
56. See id. at 52. The ordinances were based on findings of the Detroit Common Council and financial experts that these types of businesses tended to negatively effect property values in the neighboring community, cause an increase in
prostitution and encourage residents and businesses to locate elsewhere. See id. at
54-55.

57. Id. at 71. While the Court observed that the First Amendment would not
tolerate an absolute ban on adult entertainment that arguably had some artistic
value, the plurality argued that this type of expression is entitled to a lesser degree
of protection than more valuable forms of speech, such as political debate. See id.
at 70 (noting, "[flew of us would march our sons and daughters off to war to
presc-rvc the -cin's right ..... 'Specified Sexual Act;Vrt_-' evhihbted in the thpeters of our choice."). In response, the dissent argued:
[I]f the guarantees of the First Amendment were reserved for expression
that more than a "few of us" would take up arms to defend, then the right
of free expression would be defined and circumscribed by current popular opinion. The guarantees of the Bill of Rights were designed to protect against precisely such majoritarian limitations on individual liberty.
Id. at 86 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
58. See id. at 73 n.1 (Powell, J., concurring) (stating, "I do not think we need
reach, nor am I inclined to agree with, the holding . .. that nonobscene, erotic
materials may be treated differently under First Amendment principles from other
forms of protected expression.").
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Since Young, the Supreme Court has upheld similar contentneutral zoning regulations of adult businesses based on their negative secondary effects.5 9 For example, in City of Renton v. Playtime
Theatres,60 the Court noted that for the government to withstand a
First Amendment challenge to a particular regulatory scheme, it
must demonstrate that the regulated activity has negative secondary
effects on the neighboring community. 6 1 To meet this burden, the
Court held that a city does not need to conduct its own studies or
show that such effects have existed in the particular locality before
the ordinance is enacted. 62 The Ninth Circuit in Tollis, Inc. v. San
64
Bernardino County63 later espoused Renton.
In contrast to Young and Renton, the Court in Schad v. Borough
of Mt. Ephraim6 5 struck down a local time, place and manner zoning
ordinance that banned all adult theaters from every commercial
district in the city. 6 6 The Court reasoned that the municipality pro59. See City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, 475 U.S. 41, 54 (1986) (finding
ordinance valid due to problems adult theaters may create). In City of Renton, a
suit was brought challenging the constitutionality of a zoning ordinance that prohibited "adult motion picture theaters from locating within 1,000 feet of any residential zone, single-or multiple-family dwelling, church, park, or school." Id. at 43.
The Supreme Court held that the City of Renton ordinance was a valid contentneutral regulation because it was 'Justified without reference to the content of the
regulated speech." Id. at 48 (quoting Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976)).
60. 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
61. See id. at 52-53.
62. See id. at 51-52. The Court stated:
Renton was entitled to rely on the experiences of... other cities to show
the negative effects that such businesses could generate because [t]he
First Amendment does not require a city, before enacting such an ordinance, to conduct new studies or produce evidence independent of that
already generated by other cities, so long as whatever evidence the city
relies upon is reasonably believed to be relevant to the problem that the
city addresses.
Id.
63. 827 F.2d 1329, 1332 (9th Cir. 1997). The Tollis Court held:
If the ordinance is predominantly aimed at the suppression of first
amendment [sic] rights, then it is content-based and presumptively violates the first amendment [sic]. If, on the other hand, the predominant
purpose of the ordinance is aimed at the amelioration of secondary effects [in the surrounding community], then the ordinance is contentneutral and the court must then determine whether the ordinance passes
constitutional muster as a content-neutral time, place, and manner
restriction.
Id. at 1332 (citing City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 46
(1986)).
64. See id. at 1333 (finding ordinance needed to be narrowly tailored and thus
failed to meet third prong of City of Renton test).
65. 452 U.S. 61 (1981).
66. See id. at 76-77. The banned theaters contained both live entertainment
and nude dancing. See id.
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vided no conclusive evidence of a substantial interest in prohibiting
all forms of adult entertainment, and the municipality failed to
prove that there were alternative channels of communication open
67
to the businesses affected by the regulation.
2.

Distance Requirements

In Kev, Inc. v. Kitsap County,6 8 the Ninth Circuit concluded that
a local ordinance, which regulated the manner in which nude dancing could be performed, did not significantly infringe upon First
Amendment rights. 69 The ordinance imposed distance requirements upon dancers' performances.7 0 The alleged purpose of the
regulations was to deter patrons and dancers from negotiating for
drugs and prostitution at nude dancing establishments. 7' By following the "secondary effects" rationale set forth in Young and Renton,
the Kev Court reasoned that the ordinance was a valid time, place
and manner restriction. 72 The Sixth Circuit reached a similar con73
clusion in DLS, Inc. v. City of Chattanooga.
67. See id. at 73-76. According to the Court, the decision in Young did not
govern this case because in Young, "[t]
he restriction did not affect the number of
adult movie theaters that could operate in the city; it merely dispersed them." Id.
at 71.
68. 793 F.2d 1053 (9th Cir. 1986).
69. See id. at 1061-62 (concluding regulations are "reasonable time, place, and
manner restrictions that only slightly burden speech"). The ordinance provided
that:
All dancing shall occur on a platform intended for that purpose which is
raised at least two feet (2') from the level of the floor .... No dancing
shall occur closer than ten feet (10') to any patron .... No dancer shall
fondle or caress any patron and no patron shall fondle or caress any
dancer ....No patron shall directly pay or give any gratuity to any dancer
[and] no dancer shall solicit any pay or gratuity from any patron.
Id. at 1061 (citation omitted).
70. See id.
71. See id. To bolster this argument, Kitsap County presented testimony that
close contact between dancers and patrons facilitated these transactions. See id. at
1061.
72. See id. at 1062. Without offering any specific examples, the Key court concluded that alternative channels existed for the plaintiffs to convey their erotic
message. See id.
The Supreme Court has never decided the constitutionality of distance requirements. However, Justice White's dissent in Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc. suggests, at least in his view, that such regulations would be upheld. See Barnes v. Glen
Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 594 (1991).
73. 107 F.3d 403, 409 (6th Cir. 1997). The court held that the message involved was "an endorsement of erotic experience," nonetheless it upheld the ordinance under the O'Brien test for symbolic speech. Id. at 410. Initially, the court
stated that the constitutional power of the City of Chattanooga was not at issue, so
its inquiry involved only the last three of the four prongs of O'Brien. See id. With
respect to the second prong, the court held that the six-foot buffer zone requirement furthered the important state interests of disease and crime prevention be-
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Licensing Schemes

Local governments have likewise been permitted to regulate
74
the adult entertainment industry through licensing schemes. Municipalities must, however, proceed carefully in licensing regulations because American courts have historically disfavored this form
75

of prior restraint.
In FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas,76 the Supreme Court consid-

ered the constitutionality of licensing procedure requirements for
adult entertainment businesses. 77 The city integrated the licensing
scheme with zoning and inspection regulations to circumvent the
negative "secondary effects" of sexually oriented businesses in the
community. 7 The Court held that Dallas' licensing scheme was an
unconstitutional prior restraint of protected expression and lacked
79
adequate procedural safeguards.

4. Public Indecency Laws
In Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc.,8 0 owners of a nude dancing establishment challenged a public indecency statute, which banned
nude dancing altogether. 81 Barnes is one of the Supreme Court's
cause "courts have repeatedly found the prevention of crime and disease to satisfy
this part of the O'Brien test." Id. With respect to the third prong of O'Brien, the
court held that "controlling precedent establishes that the goals of crime and disease prevention are content-neutral" and "not at all inherently related to expression." Id. at 411. Finally, with respect to the fourth prong of O'Brien, the court
held that the ordinance was no broader than necessary to achieve the city's goals
of preventing crime and disease because "a buffer zone is necessary in order to
ensure that the ban on contact is enforceable." Id. at 412.
74. See Key, Inc., 793 F.2d at 1062 (recognizing constitutionality of nude dancing licensing procedures in certain circumstances). But see FW/PBS Inc. v. City of
Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 223 (1990) (holding licensing scheme unconstitutional as
allowing too much discretion on licensing authority); Southeastern Promotions,
Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 560-62 (1975) (finding licensing of live theater entertainment establishment an unconstitutional prior restraint).
75. See FW/PBS, Inc., 493 U.S. at 225 (stating that "[w] hile '[p]rior restraints
are not unconstitutional per se... [a] ny system of prior restraint... comes to this
Court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity.'") (quoting
Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 558 (1972)).
76. 493 U.S. 215 (1990).
77. See id. at 220.
78. See id. at 236 (asserting that these businesses contributed to increase in
prostitution).
79. See id. at 223. According to the Court, the government "must make the
decision whether to issue the license within a specified and reasonable time period
during which the status quo is maintained, and there must be the possibility of
prompt judicial review in the event that the license is erroneously denied." Id. at
228.
80. 501 U.S. 560 (1991).
81. See id.
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most recent articulations of the level of protection afforded to a
sexually oriented business. 82 Applying the O'Brien test, the Court
affirmed the constitutionality of Indiana's law as applied to the
plaintiffs because of the state's interest in protecting morals and
maintaining public order.83 Moreover, the ordinance was narrowly
tailored to effectuate a substantial governmental interest unrelated
84
to the suppression of expression.
Like Young, Barnes was a segmented decision and commanded
only a plurality of the Court. 85 The four dissenters in Barnes argued

for full First Amendment protection of nude dancing. 86 Justice
White exemplified the communicative element of dancing when he
stated "[in t] he varied manifestations of dancing ... lies the com-

mon impulse to resort to movement to externalise states which we
cannot externalise by rationale means."8 7 Justice Scalia, who concurred in the judgment, felt that Indiana's public indecency law was
a generally applicable law which did not implicate the First
88
Amendment.
82. See id. at 565-66 (extending First Amendment protection to nude dancing). In Barnes, two establishments that wished to display nude erotic dancing
challenged the constitutionality of Indiana's public indecency statute, which required exotic dancers to wear pasties and g-strings. Id. at 562-63. A plurality of the
Court held that nude dancing is "expressive conduct within the outer perimeters
of the First Amendment, though . . .only marginally so." Id. at 565-66.
83. See id. at 567-70.
84. See id. at 572. Applying the O'Brien test, the Court first decided that the
enactment of a public indecency statute was clearly within the state's constitutional
power. See id. at 567. The Court then held that the substantial government interest, protecting the order and morality amongst its citizens, passed the second
prong of O'Brien. See id. at 569. Because the indecency law prohibited nudity in
general, rather than specific expressive activity, the Court held the state interest
was unrelated to the suppression of expressive activity. See id. at 570. Finally, because the ordinance requires that dancers wear pasties and g-strings and does not
ban exotic dancing altogether, the Court concluded that the statute was no
broader than necessary to effectuate the asserted governmental interest. See id. at
572.
85. See Barnes, 501 U.S. at 560-61.
86. See id. at 593-94 (White, J., dissenting). The dissent argued that the nudity
component of nude dancing is the expressive activity at issue because nude dancing may generate thoughts and ideas, as well as evoke powerful emotions from its
audience. See id. at 592. Furthermore, according to Justice White, the law failed
O'Brien because the governmental interest in morality is about avoiding offense to
onlookers, and the establishments in question exclude minors and contain only
consenting viewers. See id. at 591.
87. Id. at 587-88 n.1 (White,J., dissenting) (quotingJ. MARTIN, INTRODUCTION
TO THE DANCE (1939)). Justice White further stated that "[g]enerating thoughts,
ideas, and emotions is the essence of communication." Id. at 592.
88. See id. at 572 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia rejected the dissent's
rationale that the statute's only purpose for restricting nudity in public was to protect unwilling parties from offense. See id. at 574-75. Justice Scalia hypothesized,
"[t]he purpose of Indiana's nudity law would be violated, I think, if 60,000 fully
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Circuit Conflict on Level of Protection of Nude Dancing

Various circuit courts have rendered decisions regarding First
Amendment protection of nude dancing.8 9 In BSA, Inc. v. King
County,90 the Ninth Circuit invalidated a ban on topless dancing because "[w]here a regulation places a substantial restriction on free
expression, as does this ban on nude dancing, it is subject to strict
scrutiny."9 1 In the court's opinion, the ordinance in question failed
to serve a compelling state interest. 92 However, the court upheld
the county's distance requirement as a valid time, place and man93
ner regulation.
Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit has given nude dancing constitutional protection. 9 4 In InternationalFood & Beverage System v. City
of Fort Lauderdale,95 the court stated "[n]ude dancing is constitutionally protected expression, at least if performed indoors before pay96
ing customers and not in a street or park before casual viewers.
The Eighth Circuit, in contrast, refused to extend First Amend97
ment protection to nude dancing in Walker v. City of Kansas City.

consenting adults crowded into the Hoosier Dome to display their genitals to one
another, even if there were not an offended innocent in the crowd." Id. at 575.
Scalia also concluded that laws of this type are designed to prevent activity that is
traditionally considered to be immoral. See id.
89. See, e.g., Walker v. City of Kansas City, 911 F.2d 80 (8th Cir. 1990); BSA,
Inc. v. King County, 804 F.2d 1104 (9th Cir. 1986); International Food & Beverage
Sys. v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 794 F.2d 1520 (11th Cir. 1986).
90. 804 F.2d 1104 (9th Cir. 1986).
91. Id. at 1108. In BSA, an ordinance prohibited nude exposure except that
which is "expressive dance" and added that "'common barroom type topless dancing' is expressly prohibited." Id. at 1107.
92. See id. at 1108-09. Specifically, the court concluded that the county had
not shown that its interest in reducing a burden on law enforcement could not be
achieved by a means less detrimental on protected First Amendment activity. See
id. In the court's opinion, zoning, operating hour limits, and distance requirements may all serve the state's interests while still protecting the First Amendment
conduct. See id. at 1109.
93. See id. at 1111 (reasoning that ordinance deters public sexual contact,
prostitution and other sexual criminal offenses by keeping entertainers out of
reach of patrons).
94. See International Food & Beverage Sys. v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 794
F.2d 1520, 1525 (11th Cir. 1986) (stating that protection of non-obscene nude
dancing is not absolute).
95. 794 F.2d 1520, 1525 (11th Cir. 1986).
96. Id. The InternationalFood & Beverage Sys. court remanded the case to the
district court to determine the constitutionality of a zoning ordinance in light of
City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc. See id. at 1528.
97. 911 F.2d 80 (8th Cir. 1990). In Walker, a bar owner sought an injunction
against the city of Kansas City for denying his permit application for particular
zoning required for exotic dance facilities. See id. at 84.
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The Walker court took a more radical position when it asserted that
98
nude dancing should be viewed as obscene activity.
As these cases make clear, current precedent is in flux as to the
amount of protection afforded nude dancing under the First
Amendment. It is against this constitutional background that the
Ninth Circuit rendered its decision in Colacurcio v. City of Kent.9 9
IV.
A.

NARRATIVE ANALYSIS

Majority Opinion

In Colacurcio, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals confronted
the issue of whether the City of Kent's ordinance, which required
nude dancers to perform at least ten feet from patrons, violated the
protection of free expression under the First Amendment of the
United States Constitution.1 0 0 The Colacurcio majority divided its
analysis into four sections, in which it first discussed the level of
protection afforded nude dancing under the First Amendment and
subsequently evaluated the ordinance under the three-part test set
forth in Ward v. Rock Against Racism.l0' Applying this test, the majority found that (1) the ordinance was content-neutral; (2) the ordinance was narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental
interest; and (3) there remained ample alternative channels for
communication of the information.' 0 2 As was held in Ward, the
court concluded that the ordinance did not violate the First
Amendment and found in favor of the City of Kent.' 0 3
The majority in Colacurciofirst discussed the level of protection
that has been given to nude dancing under the First Amendment. 10 4 The court stated, however, that "It] he fragmented nature
98. See id. at 87, 90. The Walker court applied the Miller test for obscene material and concluded that nude dancing constituted obscenity within the meaning of
Miller. See id. For a discussion of the Miller test, see supra note 32 and accompanying text.
99. 163 F.3d 545 (9th Cir. 1998).
100. See id

t

54P-4.

The Coac,rrio rn,,rt considered whether the United

States District Court for the Western District of Washington erred in concluding as
a matter of law that Kent's ordinance did not violate the First Amendment. See id.
When reviewing a grant of summary judgment, the reviewing court determines de
novo whether there are any genuine issues of material fact and whether the district
court correctly applied the relevant substantive law. See id. at 549.
101. Id. at 549-58 (citing Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989)).
102. See id. (upholding district court's determinations).
103. See id. at 557.
104. See Colacurcio, 163 F.3d at 549-50. To begin its analysis, the court reiterated the district court's finding that nude dancing is a form of expression under
the First Amendment. See id. (citing Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410-11
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of Supreme Court opinions dealing with nude dancing in particular
and sexually explicit but non-obscene conduct.., has resulted in a
lack of clear guidance on the level of First Amendment protection
.... 105 In attempting to establish some standard for the level of
protection, the court reiterated the district court's reliance on
Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., in which the Supreme Court stated that
nude dancing "is expressive conduct within the outer perimeters of
the First Amendment, though . . . only marginally so."' 106 The appellants, on the other hand, argued that the Ninth Circuit has afforded nude dancing "full First Amendment protection" and
1 07
instead relied on the decision in Key, Inc. v. Kitsap County.
After reviewing Supreme Court cases, the Ninth Circuit in Colacurciowas still unclear about the level of First Amendment protection that has been afforded to nude dancing.' 0 8 Although the
court discussed cases, which seemed to side with less than full First
Amendment protection, it also noted one scholar's observation that
"no Court has yet squarely held that sexually explicit but non-ob10 9
scene speech enjoys less than full First Amendment protection."
Without determining what level of protection to apply to nude
dancing, the Colacurcio court analyzed the ordinance to determine
whether it was content-neutral."10
(1974)). The Supreme Court has determined that "conduct is expressive when the
following two factors are present: (1) intent to convey a particularized message;
and (2) a substantial likelihood that the message will be understood by those receiving it." Colacurcio, 163 F.3d at 549 n.1.
105. Id. at 550.
106. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 565-66 (1991).
107. See Colacurcio, 163 F.3d at 549-50.
108. See id. at 550. The court concluded its discussion of the level of First
Amendment protection with further evidence of the uncertainty of the correct
standard. See id. The court cited several scholars who have also "grappled with the
problem of the uncertain status of nude dancing and adult entertainment under
the First Amendment." Id.
109. Id. at 550 (quoting TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIoNAL LAw §§ 12-18 p.
938 (2d ed. 1988)). In reviewing the proper standard of First Amendment protection for nude dancing, the Colacurcio court examined Supreme Court decisions
involving this issue. See id. at 550. In Young v. American Mini-Theatres,Inc., a plurality of the Court concluded that adult entertainment should be considered "low
value" speech stating, "few of us would march our sons and daughters off to war to
preserve the citizen's fight to see 'Specified Sexual Activities' exhibited in the theaters of our choice." 427 U.S. 50, 70 (1976). Yet, five justices of the Court in Young,
one concurring and four dissenting, believed that the level of First Amendment
protection "should not vary with the social value ascribed to speech by the courts."
Colacurcio, 163 F.3d at 550 (citing Young, 427 U.S. at 73 n.1). Relying on the voting
tally taken in Young, the Ninth Circuit ascribed full First Amendment protection
for nude dancing in its decision in Kev, Inc., v. Kitsap County. See id. (citing Kev,
Inc. v. Kitsap County, 793 F.2d 1053, 1058 (9th Cir. 1986)).
110. See Colacurcio, 163 F.3d at 550-53. The court did, however, review the
Supreme Court decision in Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., a Supreme Court case de-
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The court began its examination of the ordinance under the
three-part test set forth in Ward v. Rock Against Racism, by determining whether the ordinance was content-neutral. 1 1 In order to meet
the content-neutrality requirement, the relevant ordinance must be
"'aimed to control secondary effects resulting from the protected
expression' rather than inhibiting the protected expression itself."11 2 To determine whether this requirement was satisfied, it was
necessary to look to all of the "objective indicators of intent," including the "face of the statute, the effect of the statute, comparison to prior law, fact surrounding enactment, the stated purpose,
' 11 3
and the record of proceedings."
After setting forth the correct inquiries for content-neutrality,
the court considered the appellants' argument that the legislature's
real purpose in enacting the ordinance was to ban adult entertainment in the City of Kent. 1 14 In support of this argument, the appellants relied on statements made by City officials of the ordinance's

Planning Commission, which indicated intent to regulate the actual
cided fifteen years after Young. See id. In Barnes, a plurality of the Court restated
the conclusion from Young, namely that nude dancing should only be afforded
marginal First Amendment protection. See Barnes, 501 U.S. at 560-72. However, in
Barnes, four justices dissented, stating that nude dancing should be given full First
Amendment protection; Justice Scalia, who concurred in the decision, opined that
this regulation was not directed at speech at all but rather at conduct. See Colacurcio, 163 F.3d at 550 n.3 (citing Barnes, 501 U.S. at 593). Justice Souter concurred in the decision and found that nude dancing should be afforded low-level
First Amendment protection "noting that 'society's interest in protecting this type
of expression is of a wholly different, and lesser, magnitude than the interest in

untrammeled political debate.'" Id. (quoting Barnes, 501 U.S. at 584 (Souter, J.,
concurring)). Justice White, joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens,
argued that nude dancing should be given full First Amendment protection. See
id. (citing Barnes, 501 U.S. at 593 (White, J., dissenting)).
111. See Colacurcio, 163 F.3d at 551. The court in Colacurcioset forth the First
Amendment test: "Municipalities may impose reasonable restrictions on the time,
place or manner of protected speech, provided the restrictions are: (1) contentneutral; (2) narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest; and (3)
leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the information." Id.
(citing Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989)).
112. Colacurcio, 163 F.3d at 551 (quoting Tollis, Inc. v. San Bernardino
County, 827 F.2d 1329, 1332 (9 t C'987.
.
)). More
... specifically, the Colacurcio
court stated, "[i] f the ordinance is predominantly aimed at the suppression of First
Amendment rights, then it is content-based and presumptively violates the First
Amendment. If, on the other hand, the predominant purpose of the ordinance is
the amelioration of secondary effects in the surrounding community, the ordinance is content-neutral . . . ." Id. (quoting Tollis, 827 F.2d at 1332). The court
gave examples of secondary effects, "which included, but were not limited to,
threats to public health or safety." Id.
113. Colacurcio,163 F.3d at 552 (quoting City of Las Vegas v. Foley, 747 F.2d
1294, 1297 (9th Cir. 1984)).
114. See id. (bringing forth evidence of city's illicit purpose for enacting
ordinance).
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expression of exotic dancing rather than the secondary effects."

5

These statements, appellants argued, reveal that the ordinance was
"aimed at the suppression of First Amendment rights," rendering it
content-based.

16

The court rejected the appellant's use of these statements as
evidence of the purpose of the ordinance."17 The court stated that
individual statements given by City officials were only relevant if
"they show[ed] objective manifestations of an illicit purpose . ..
such as a departure from normal procedures or a sudden change in
policy."11 8 Because this ordinance was consistent with the City's
comprehensive planning policy, the court decided that the statements were not objective indicators of an illicit purpose and were
therefore, not relevant.1 1 9
The court then turned to appellants' contention that the City's
past behavior of adopting "the most restrictive regulations possible"
in relation to nude dance studios was a further indication that the
City is attempting to suppress the expression of nude dancing
rather than its secondary effects.1 20 The court, however, rejected
this argument, stating that the record rebutted appellants' conten-

115. See id. at 552. For example, appellants cited to a statement given by the
City Attorney at a Planning Commission meeting: "Since we cannot zone these
type[s] of businesses out of the City, the licensing was looked at that was in place
for this type of facility ....As indicated, these uses cannot be prohibited, but they
can be regulated." Id. Appellants also relied on a statement given by the Planning
Commission Chairman: "With all the regulations we have adopted and stuff, I'm
not too concerned that someone's going to come and try to open something up.
Because we've made it a little bit difficult for them to make money in the traditional way they make money." Id.
116. Id. at 550-52.
117. See id. (citing Foley, 747 F.2d at 1298). In Foley, the court stated that individual statements by city leaders were admissible if they "showed the chain of
events from which intent may be inferred, rather than merely the subjective intent
of individual legislators." Foley, 747 F.2d at 1298.
118. Colacurcio, 163 F.3d at 552. The court noted that a "departure from normal procedures or a sudden change in policy" was objective evidence of an illicit
purpose. Id.
119. See id. The court stated that "the record [in this case] does not indicate
unusual procedural maneuvering on the part of the Kent Planning Committee,
Planning Commission, City Attorney, or other City governing bodies." Id. Additionally, the ordinance "reflects no procedural lapses that might suggest unjust
treatment." Id.
120. Id. at 552. Appellants, here, relied on the fact that in 1994, the City was
forced to change its zoning laws when the district court found the City's ordinance
"failed to designate a sufficient number of sites for the location of adult businesses." Id. at 548.
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tion, showing that the City's restrictions on adult entertainment
12 1
have "grown more lenient over time."'
The Colacurciocourt, in its conclusion of the content-neutrality
prong, discussed the City's development of the ordinance. 122 The
court noted that the City presented evidence of the harmful effects
that table dancing would have on the community in terms of prostitution, drug dealing, and other criminal activity. 123 This evidence,
the court concluded, outweighed the evidence presented by appellants concerning the mixed motivations of some City officials. 124
The court, therefore, found the ordinance to be content-neutral
125
and 'justified without reference to speech."'
Next, the court addressed the second prong of the three-part
test: whether the ordinance was narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest. 126 This prong is satisfied "so long as
the... regulation promotes a substantial government interest that
would be achieved less effectively absent the regulation."' 2 7 However, a time, place and manner restriction is prohibited from burdening substantially more speech than is necessary.1 28
The court rejected appellants' argument that the ordinance's
ten-foot distance rule did not satisfy the narrowly tailored requirement. Appellants' argued that there were less speech-restrictive
means of achieving the government interests such as a "no-touch"
requirement or a one-foot distance rule. 129 In response to this argument, the court stated that time, manner or place restrictions
121. Id. at 552. The record revealed that the City devoted considerable resources to create an ordinance that would be valid under the Constitution. See id.
at 553. The Colacurcio court noted that a comment made by the City Attorney in
1995 indicated this devotion: "These uses cannot be prohibited but they can be
regulated... the question is where do we put this type of business and how many
sites do we allow." Id.
122. See id.
123. See Colacurcio, 163 F.3d at 552.
124. See id. at 553. The City presented the court with affidavits and statements
made by police officers that documented the "connection between table dancing
and illegal sexual activity." Id.
125. -N.
126. See id. at 553 (setting forth Ward standard). "A regulation of the time,
place or manner of protected speech must be narrowly tailored to serve the government's legitimate content-neutral interests, but it need not be the least restrictive or the least intrusive means." Colacurcio, 163 F.3d at 553 (citing Ward v. Rock

Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 798-99 (1989)).

127. Id. (quoting Ward, 491 U.S. at 799).
128. See Colacurcio, 163 F.3d 553. The court quoted Ward in support of this
proposition: "Government may not regulate expression in such a manner that a
substantial portion of the burden on speech does not serve to advance its goal." Id.
(quoting Ward, 491 U.S. at 799).
129. See id.
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"will not violate the First Amendment 'simply because there is some
imaginable alternative that might be less burdensome on
speech." 130 The court, in concluding that the ordinance was narrowly tailored, noted that "courts have emphasized that judges
should not supplant the legislature's role in developing the most
3
appropriate methods for achieving government purposes."' '
Remaining within the narrowly tailored prong, the court next

addressed whether the ordinance burdened more speech than necessary. 13 2 The court, however, stated that this argument was foreclosed by its earlier decision in Kev, which upheld a ten-foot
distance requirement. 133 Appellants, in turn, argued that the district court did not have the opportunity to apply the Ward test in
this case since Kev was decided prior to Ward.13 4 This argument
failed for two reasons. First, the court stated that it did not have to
reach the issue of whether the ten-foot requirement is too burdensome because the "fine-tuning of the distance requirement should
be left to the legislative body;" second, appellants' less-restrictive alternatives were not "reasonable" alternatives since they would not
"serve the City's purposes in controlling drug transactions and prostitution."' 3 5 In concluding that the ordinance fully satisfied the

narrowly tailored prong of the First Amendment test, the court
stated that appellants failed to present adequate evidence showing
130. Id. at 553 (quoting U.S. v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 689 (1985)). The
court stated further that the validity of such a restriction "does not turn on a
judge's agreement with the responsible decisionmaker concerning the most appropriate method for promoting significant government interests." Id. (quoting Albertini, 472 U.S. at 689).
131. Id. at 553.
132. See Colacurcio, 163 F.3d 554 (concluding that district court was correct in
following Kev).
133. See id. at 554. For a discussion of the Ninth Circuit's decision in Kev, see
supra notes 68-72 and accompanying text.
134. See Colacurcio, 163 F.3d at 554. Kev was decided in 1986, whereas Ward
was decided in 1989. See id. at 550-51. The Kev court, therefore, did not use the
Ward test to determine whether the ordinance burdens too much speech. See id. at
554. For a discussion of the standard set forth in Ward, see supra notes 4243 and
accompanying text.
135. Id. at 554. The court cited to several earlier decisions that have upheld
ordinances that are similar to that of the City of Kent. See id. (citing BSA, Inc. v.
King County, 804 F.2d 1104, 1112 (9th Cir. 1986) (upholding six-foot distance
requirement)); DLS, Inc. v. Chattanooga, 107 F.3d 403 (6th Cir. 1997) (same)).
Moreover, the court stated that the appellants' less restrictive means would be unenforceable, "as both would fail to provide sufficient line-of-vision for law enforcement personnel." Colacurcio, 163 F.3d at 554. Additionally, both of appellants'
suggestions would "permit verbal communication between dancers and patrons,
thereby failing to curtail propositions for drugs or sex." Id.
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that the ordinance burdened substantially more speech than
necessary.136

The final prong of the three-part test required the court to review whether the ordinance would "leave open ample alternative
channels for communication of the information." 13 7 Appellants argued that the ordinance clearly failed this prong because table
dancing is a unique form of expression fully prohibited by the ordinance, thereby leaving no channels of communication. 138 The
court assumed, arguendo that table dancing is a unique form of
expression, but the court related that "precedent indicates [that]
uniqueness, alone, is insufficient to trigger separate First Amendment protection."'1 39 In response, the court looked to the purportedly governmental interests protected and weighed these interests
against the uniqueness of table dancing. 140 The court concluded
that "table dancing in private nightclubs, with documented links to
prostitution and drug dealing, was a highly unlikely candidate for
41
special protection under the First Amendment."'
The court then continued to address the appellants' claim that
banning dancing at a proximity of less then ten feet would in effect
leave no alternative channels for this information. 4 2 The appellants borrowed from a public forum analysis and asserted that the
forum in this case should be the area necessary for table dancing
rather than the entire bar. 143 Following this argument, then, the
136. See id.
137. Id. (citing Ward, 491 U.S. at 791).
138. See id. at 555. Appellants argued that table dancing is "qualitatively different" from nude stage dancing and is therefore entitled to separate First Amendment analysis. Id. Appellants further argued that because the ordinance
eliminates table dancing altogether, a form of expression where close proximity
between patrons and dancers is an essential element, no alternative forms of this
communication exist. See id. at 555. In support of their contention, appellants
introduced evidence of a cultural anthropologist attesting to the "uniqueness of
table dancing and the detrimental effect of the ten-foot rule on the dancer's message." Id.
139. Colacurcio, 163 F.3d at 555. The court stated that "[t]he Supreme Court
generally will not strike down a governmental action for failure to leave open ample alternative channels of communications unless the government enactment will
foreclose an entire medium of public expression across the landscape of a particular community or setting." Id. (quoting Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453
U.S. 490, 525-27 (1981)). The court assumed for its analysis that table dancing was
a unique form of expression. See id.
140. See id. at 556.
141. Id. The court stated that it was necessary, when assessing a First Amendment claim, to look not only to the private claims in the complaint but also to the
government interests being served. See id. at 555.
142. See id. at 556 (extending public forum principles).
143. See id. (leaving no avenues of expression within forum).
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ordinance eliminated all channels of information within the table
dancing "forum." The court rejected this argument, stating that if
it were to follow appellants' line of logic, the court would be required to evaluate lap dancing or any other distinguishable form of
nude entertainment as a separate form of First Amendment
expression.144
Finally, the court addressed appellants' contention that the ordinances' prohibition on tipping along with the distance requirement, would "prevent exotic dancers from making a living in Kent
*

.

. and, in turn, force appellants to go out of business."'145 This

prohibition would reach every establishment in the table dancing
business and, therefore, would foreclose an entire form of expression. 146 The court rejected this final argument, however, noting
that appellants did not present enough evidence to satisfy the applicable test, which required proof that the business could not operate
147
under the regulations at issue.
B.

The Dissent

Judge Reinhardt began his dissent stating that "[b]y requiring
nude dancers to perform on a raised platform and to remain at
least ten feet away from customers, the City of Kent effectively outlawed table-dancing."1 48 Reinhardt believed that the essential question of this case was whether table dancing was a separate form of
149
expression, warranting its own First Amendment analysis.
Judge Reinhardt initially criticized the court for failing to resolve any legal issues in its analysis of the level of protection that
should be afforded to nude dancing.1 50 Reinhardt argued that the
majority left the impression that nude dancing was "low-value"
144. See Colacurcio, 163 F.3d at 556. The court stated that appellants' argument failed "due to the incongruity of its potential results." Id. The court further
reasoned that under this argument, "[a]ny distance requirement, even a one-foot
setback, would amount to a flat ban on communication within that 'forum."' Id.
145. Id. at 556. Appellants argued that because the table dancers, employed
in their establishments, were independent contractors who pay appellants rental
fees from their tips, banning tips would make dancers unable to pay and force the
closure of the establishment. See id. at 557.
146. See id. at 557 (rendering regulation violative of the First Amendment).
147. See id. (applying test of whether business could operate under

regulation).
148. Id. at 558 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting). In Judge

Reinhardt's view, the district court erred in granting summary judgment. See id. at 557-58.
149. See Colacurcio, 163 F.3d at 558 (asserting that appellants presented
enough evidence to establish triable issue of fact).
150. See id. at 558 (rejecting majority's characterization of First Amendment
protection).
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speech, while failing to note that in the Ninth Circuit "nude erotic
dancers [were clearly] entitled to full First Amendment protection
151
for the expressive messages conveyed in their dancing."
Reinhardt then criticized the majority for incorrectly deciding
that the ordinance was content-neutral as a matter of law. 152 He
stated that, in order to decide this issue correctly, the majority
should have evaluated more closely appellants' evidence that table
dancing is a unique form of expression warranting separate First
Amendment analysis. 153 Reinhardt believed that this issue should
have gone to ajury and further reasoned that "[t]o the extent that
a reasonable trier of fact might conclude that table dancing and
stage dancing are qualitatively distinct forms of expression, the ordinance is itself facially content-based. ' 154 Finally, Reinhardt concluded that it was inappropriate for either the district court or the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals to "substitute its own views regarding the purpose and effect of table dancing" and Reinhardt would
1 55
therefore reverse the district court's grant of summary judgment.
V.

CRITICAL ANALYSIS

The Colacurcio court acknowledged that nude dancing is symbolic speech entitled to First Amendment protection. 156 The court
correctly identified the test set forth in Ward v. Rock Against Racism
151. Id. (citing Key, Inc. v. Kitsap County, 793 F.2d 1053, 1058 (9th Cir.
1986)). Reinhardt criticized the majority for failing to take a closer look at the
level of protection afforded to nude dancing, simply because the law in this area is
unclear. See id.
152. See id. Reinhardt stated that the requirement of content-neutrality was
satisfied only when the regulation can be justified "without reference to the content of speech." Id. (citing City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41,
47-48 (1986)). He believes that the majority concluded the ordinance was contentneutral simply because it was not content-based, thereby failing to consider the
real issue of whether table dancing is a distinct form of expression from nude
dancing. See Colacurcio, 163 F.3d at 558-59.
153. See id.
154. Colacurcio,163 F.3d at 559. Reinhardt, to a much larger extent than the
majority, evaluated the evidence that appellants presented relating to the issue of
whcthcr tablc-dancing is a unique form of expression. See id. Inhs eyes, this ei
dence was more than adequate to defeat a motion for summary judgment by the
City. See id. at 558-59.

155. Id. at 559.
156. See, e.g., Barnes v. Glen Theatre, 501 U.S. 560 (1991) (recognizing that
nude dancing is protected form of expression under First Amendment); City of
Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986) (finding adult movie theater
entitled to First Amendment protection); Schad v. Borough of Mt. Ephraim, 452
U.S. 61 (1981) (finding ordinance prohibiting live nude dancing unconstitutional); Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976) (plurality) (affording First Amendment protection to movie theater that displayed sexually
explicit films on regular basis).
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as the appropriate tool for analyzing regulations of nude dancing
entitled to full First Amendment protection; however, the court
15 7
erred in its application of the first and third prongs of this test.
Specifically, the court incorrectly concluded that the ordinance was
content-neutral and further erred in determining that the ordinance left open ample alternative channels of communication.
More significantly, however, the court failed to recognize that the
Kent ordinance not only regulates symbolic speech governed by
Ward, but it also effectively regulates verbal discourse between a
dancer and her patron, which is more properly analyzed under the
58
test set forth in Brandenburg v. Ohio.'
1.

The Ward Test

a.

Content Neutrality

The Colacurcio court's conclusion that the City of Kent's ordinance is content-neutral is erroneous in two respects. First, the
court, in rejecting appellants' argument that the ordinance is
facially content-based, effectively ignored the differences between
stage dancing and table dancing. 159 Second, the Colacurciocourt, in
concluding that the ordinance is content-neutral, failed to recognize that the ordinance is aimed at the suppression of speech rather
160
than the secondary effects stemming from the speech.
The Colacurciocourt wrongfully rejected appellants' contention
that the ordinance is facially content-based because it restricts a
unique form of expression. 161 In support of this contention, appellants offered the testimony of a cultural anthropologist and a com157. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989). For a discussion of Ward, see supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text. In Ward, the Court
reasoned that this analysis was the same as the O'Brien test: "validating a regulation
of expressive conduct . . . in the last analysis is little, if any, different from the
standard applied to time, place, or manner restrictions." Id. at 798 (citing Clark v.
Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 298 (1984)).
158. Compare Ward, 491 U.S. 781 (setting forth standard for constitutional regulation of symbolic speech), with Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (setting forth standard for constitutional regulation of unprotected speech that incites
illegal activity).
159. See Colacurcio, 163 F.3d at 549, 550-53. In fact, the expert testimony offered by appellants was barely mentioned in the majority opinion. See id. at 549.
160. Id. at 550-53. For a discussion of the secondary effects test espoused in
Tollis and used by the Ninth Circuit in this case, see supra note 63 and accompanying text.
161. See Colacurcio, 163 F.3d at 552. In finding that the Kent ordinance was
not content-based, the Colacurcio court stated that "[t]he ordinance does not distinguish between table dancing and other exotic dance forms," the stated purposes
do not "mention the ills of table dancing," and "[t]he ten-foot distance requirement applies to all form of dancing" within adult entertainment establishments. Id.
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munications expert who both indicated that the proximity between
a table dancer and patron is integral to the emotive message that
the dancer attempts to convey. 16 2 Because it is the proximity that
distinguishes the "particularized message" conveyed through table
dancing from the "particularized message" conveyed through nude
dancing, a distance requirement that eliminates this proximity
clearly restricts a unique form of expression. 163 This evidence
164
strongly indicated that the ordinance was facially content-based.
Additionally, the Colacurcio majority erroneously determined
that the ordinance is content-neutral based upon a faulty analysis of
the secondary effects test set forth by the Supreme Court in City of
Renton v. Playtime Theatres.' 65 Essentially, this test provides that a
162. See id. at 555, 558-59 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting). More specifically, these
experts testified that "the message of the table dancer is personal interest in the
customer," and that "[t ] he entertainer creates an illusion of concern and availability for the customer." Id. at 558-59. (Reinhardt, J., dissenting). By contrast, "stage
dancing communicates 'the remoteness of the unreachable object of desire'
through its use of distance." Id. at 559 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
163. See generally Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410-11 (1974) (finding
symbolic speech protected when intended to communicate particularized message); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (holding that words "fuck the draft"
embodied significant emotive content to trigger First Amendment protection).
164. See BSA, Inc., v. King County, 804 F.2d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 1986). In
BSA, the Ninth Circuit, in finding a distance requirement to be content-neutral,
stated: " [ t] here is no allegation that the distance requirement between entertainer
and patron is an integral part of the expressive activity, or that 'the viewing public
is less able to satisfy its appetite for sexually explicit fare.'" Id. (quoting Young v.
American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 62 (1976)). In Colacurcio, unlike in
BSA, appellants do argue and present evidence to support that the distance is integral to table dancing's message. See Colacurcio, 163 F.3d at 559.
165. See Colacurcio, 163 F.3d at 551-53 (citing City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, 475 U.S. 41, 47-48 (1986)). This test was later espoused by the Ninth Circuit
in Tollis, Inc. v. San Bernardino County and reads: "If the ordinance is predominantly aimed at the suppression of First Amendment rights, then it is contentbased and presumptively violates the First Amendment. If, on the other hand, the
predominate purpose of the ordinance is the amelioration of secondary effects in
the surrounding community, the ordinance is content-neutral, and the court must
then determine whether it passes constitutional muster as a content-neutral time,
place and manner regulation." Id. at 551 (quoting Tollis, Inc. v. San Bernardino
County, 827 F.2d 1329, 1332 (9th Cir. (1997)). The court, however, fails to consider the criticism within the legal community of the "secondary ettects" test. See
McDonald, supra note 1, at 351. As Justice Brennan once stated, the "secondary
effects" justification for restrictions on expressive conduct "creates a possible avenue for government censorship whenever censors can concoct secondary rationalizations for regulating the content of speech." Id. (citing Boos v. Berry, 485 U.S.
312 (1988) (Brennan, J., concurring). Brennan's prophesy seemingly came alive
in Colacurcio, as evidence presented by appellants strongly suggested that the "secondary effects" rationale employed by this legislature was simply a guise for suppressing a disfavored form of communication. See Colacurcio, 163 F.3d at 552.
Appellants quoted the following statement made by the City Planning Committee
Chairman: "With all the regulations we have adopted and stuff, I'm not too concerned that someone is going to come and try to open something up. Because
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regulation is content-neutral if the predominant purpose of the
regulation is to ameliorate the secondary effects of the speech on
the surrounding community rather than suppressing the speech itself. 16 6 Although the court in Colacurciobases its application of the
secondary effects test on the decision in Renton, it is easily distinguishable. 167 Specifically, the ordinance in Renton was aimed at dissipating the harmful secondary effects of a concentration of adult
theaters by mandating their relocation to specific areas in the community. 168 Thus, the ordinance did not suppress protected speech
but merely relocated the speech in order to preserve the quality of
urban life.
Moreover, the City of Kent's ordinance, unlike the ordinance
in Renton, is specifically directed at suppressing the message that is
169
communicated when patrons are less than ten feet from dancers.
Appellants contend that the proximity element makes table dancing a unique form of expression.1 70 In response, the City argued
that it is this very proximity that gives rise to the harmful secondary
effects it seeks to combat.1 71 The Supreme Court has made clear
that a law will not satisfy the secondary effects analysis if the "effect"
1 72
turns directly upon the communicative impact of the speech.
we've made it a little bit difficult for them to make money in the traditional way
they make money." Id. Although this and other statements were dismissed by the
Colacurciomajority as irrelevant with respect to a statute's intended purpose, they
are relevant because they give credence to Justice Brennan's concern for the validity of the "secondary effects" test. See Boos v. Berry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988) (Brennan,
J., concurring).
166. See Colacurcio, 163 F.3d at 551 (citing Tollis, 827 F.2d at 1332). In other
words, a regulation is content-neutral if it is "justified without reference to the
content of the regulated speech." Id. (quoting Renton, 475 U.S. at 48).
167. For a discussion of the facts and the decision in Renton, see supra notes
59-62 and accompanying text.
168. See Renton, 475 U.S. at 931. Specifically, the City presented evidence of
the negative effects of the presence of adult theaters on neighborhood children
and community improvement efforts. See id.; see also Young, 427 U.S. at 50 (finding
ordinance aimed at ameliorating harmful secondary effects by relocating adult entertainment establishments constitutional because not aimed at suppressing
speech).
169. See Colacurcio, 163 F.3d at 559 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting). Although the
City does not admit that its purpose was to suppress speech, in reality the ordinance is aimed at the speech rather than at ameliorating the secondary effects. See
id.
170. See id. (Reinhardt, J., dissenting). For further discussion of appellants'
uniqueness argument, see supra notes 152-55 and accompanying text.
171. See Colacurcio, 163 F.3d at 553. The City of Kent offered affidavits and
statements by police officers and detectives that documented the connection between table dancing and illegal sexual activity. See id.
172. See Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988) (striking down statute prohibiting
demonstrations within 500 feet of foreign embassy if demonstrations bring foreign
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Surely then, the ordinance enacted by the City of Kent cannot be
deemed content-neutral because it is aimed at the very element that
1 73
gives table-dancing its unique communicative impact.
b.

Ample Alternative Channels of Communication

As Ward makes clear, a law restricting speech must leave open
ample alternative channels of communication. 174 The Colacurcio
court, in evaluating this prong, failed to consider that the Kent ordinance effectively eliminates table dancing as a form of expression. 175 Table dancers in Kent do not have the option of dancing
17 6
in a designated zone in the City, as the dancers did in Renton.
The City of Kent's ordinance, therefore, is not a valid time, place
and manner restriction because it fails to leave open ample alterna77
tive channels of communication.
2.

Incitement of Illegal Activity under Brandenburgv. Ohio

Facially, the City of Kent's ordinance restricts a dancer's ability
to come within ten feet of her patron in hopes of preventing the
verbal communication that the government argues will incite drug
government into disrepute because effect turned directly on communicative impact of speech).
173. See Colacurcio, 163 F.3d at 558-59 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting) (asserting
appellants' expert created triable issue of fact on content neutrality).
174. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 802-03 (1989); see also Clark
v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 298-99 (1984). In both
Ward and Clark, neither of the regulations totally banned the activity being regulated. See Clark, 468 U.S. at 298-99; Ward, 491 U.S. at 803. In Clark, an individual
could camp overnight as a form of demonstration in a park service designated
camping area. See Clark, 468 U.S. at 290. Similarly, performers in Ward could still
use the bandshell. See Ward, 491 U.S. at 802.
175. See Colacurcio,163 F.3d at 554-57. Appellants argued that by prohibiting
nude dancing at a distance of less than ten feet from patrons, the Kent ordinance
left no alternative channels open for table dancing because this form of expression
would be banned altogether. See id.
176. In Renton, by contrast, adult entertainment establishments could still exist within city limits - the theaters merely needed to relocate in order to comply
475 U.S. 41, 47.198)
with the statute. See City of Rctu-n v. Piaytimc Thcatr,
(noting that zoning ordinance does not altogether ban activity); see also Young v.
American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976) (same).
177. See Colacurcio, 163 F.3d at 559 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting). To take the
proximity out of nude dancing is to essentially ban an entire mode of expression.
See id. The communications expert who testified on behalf of the appellant concluded that:
The relational and erotic communication sought to be communicated by
erotic dance performance is significantly and substantially effected [sic],
reduced, and degraded by the requirement that performers be separated
from their intended audience by a minimum distance of ten feet.
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transactions and prostitution. 178 The Colacurcio court correctly addressed this distance restriction under Ward, as that is the appropriate test for analyzing restrictions of artistic expression. 179 However,
by only applying Ward, the court failed to address that this ordinance's distance requirement restricts more than just a dancer's artistic expression-it effectively prohibits all conversation a dancer
180
may wish to have with her patron.
According to the Supreme Court, a government wishing to
prohibit conversation that may incite unlawful activity may do so
only if the speech satisfies the standard set forth in Brandenburg v.
Ohio.' 81 To properly invoke Brandenburg,however, the speech must
first be speech advocating a crime.18 2 The City cannot assume that
all speech between a dancer and her patron will be speech advocating a crime. Even if some of the conversations that a dancer has
with her patron is intended to incite illegal activity and may be unprotected speech under Brandenburgv. Ohio, the ten-foot distance
requirement prohibits a dancer's conversation with her patron in
83
its entirety.
VI.

IMPACT

The Ninth Circuit's holding in Colacurcio has, at least for the
present time, decided that a municipality may constitutionally impose a ten-foot distance requirement between a nude dancer and
178. See id. at 553. When met with the option of imposing a "no touch" or
one-foot requirement as less burdensome alternatives, the city argued that "both of
these options would permit verbal communications between dancers and patrons,
thereby failing to curtail propositions for drugs or sex." Id. at 554. A ten-foot
requirement, by contrast, "covers two arm spans and keeps patrons out of earshot."
Id.
179. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989). For further
discussion of Ward, see supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
180. See, e.g., Key, Inc. v. Kitsap County, 793 F.2d 1053, 1061 (9th Cir. 1986).
The municipality in Kev enacted a distance requirement to "prevent patrons and
dancers from [the verbal discourse which is necessary in] negotiating for narcotics
transfers on the premises of an erotic dance studio." Id.
181. 395 U.S. 444 (1969). Brandenburg provided that speech advocating the
use of force or crime can only be proscribed where: (1) the advocacy is directed to
inciting or producing imminent lawless action; and (2) the advocacy is also likely
to incite or produce such action. See id. at 447.
182. See id. For further discussion of the facts and analysis of Brandenburg,see
supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
183. According to one scholar, there are two sides to Brandenburg. Brandenburg, "draws a line ... defining where speech ends and where unprotected utterances begin." David Crump, Camouflaged Incitement: Freedom of Speech,
Communicative Torts, and the Border Land of the Brandenburg Test, 29 GA. L. REv. 1, 5
(1994).
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her patron.18 4 In arriving at this conclusion, the court has added to
the confusing body of case law regarding regulations of nude dancing under the First Amendment.18 5 More significantly, the Colacurcio decision effectively eliminates table dancing as a unique
form of expression, thereby directly impacting the lives of nude
dancers and the owners of adult entertainment establishments.
As the court in Colacurcio notes, the law surrounding nude
dancing and the First Amendment is vague and unsettled.1 8 6 In
failing to make any legal conclusions regarding the level of protection to be afforded this type of symbolic speech, the court builds
upon the uncertainty already existing within the Supreme Court
and its fellow circuits.18 7 Perhaps it is time for the Supreme Court
to provide some clear guidance as to the proper standard to be
88

applied.1

The more obvious effect of the Colacurcio decision will be felt
outside the legal community by the dancers and owners of adult
entertainment establishments. A ten-foot distance requirement will
make it difficult, if not impossible, for a dancer to procure tips,
which are essential to her survival in this vocation. 189 This, in turn,
will force dancers to relocate to another city or to find an alternative means of support. In effect, this will force the owners of these

184. See Colacurcio, 163 F.3d at 548.
185. See id. at 549-50. The court in Colacurcio had trouble determining what
level of First Amendment protection is proper in this case. See id.
186. For a discussion of cases involving the level of protection of nude dancing, see supra notes 50-99 and accompanying text.
187. See Colacurcio, 163 F.3d at 558 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting). Reinhardt
stated that in determining the proper level of protection, the majority "resolve[d]
no~~~sus
ica u sought]1 to lea-Ve the impesio that nude dancing may merely
be 'low value' speech entitled to 'only marginal First Amendment protection.'" Id.
188. Additionally, this decision effectively allows an ordinance to regulate discussion between a nude dancer and her patron by mandating a distance where this
conversation is not feasible. The right of citizens to speak to one another seems to
strike at the very core of the First Amendment. If the government is allowed to
prohibit such day-to-day conversations merely because of a fear that illegal transactions may occur, it is difficult to see how the First Amendment will continue to
protect our freedom to speak.
189. See Colacurcio, 163 F.3d at 556-57. Appellants argued that tips obtained
from table dances are the main source of revenue for these dancers, who are not
compensated for stage dances. See id. at 556.
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establishments out of business, because their success turns upon the
dancer's success. 190
Jenna Doviak
Gina Scamby
190. See id. at 556-57. Specifically, the distance requirement would prevent
exotic dancers from making a living and, as appellants contend, "would make it
uneconomical and therefore impossible for adult clubs to open and operate in the
city." Id. at 556.
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